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Give and Take? Procedure, Practicalities, and Policy in
Naturalization Appellate Jurisdiction
“Naturalization is an act of great personal consequence to American
Immigrants, involving major reorganizations in their sense of identity and
offering a new beginning for many. Accordingly, the Committee
emphasizes that the paramount consideration of this legislation and its
implementation should be the applicants.” 1
These words, from a 1989 House Report on the Immigration and
Nationality Act, provide a clear and significant reminder of the import of
naturalization—a matter not simply of being a resident of the United States
of America, but of becoming an American citizen. They remind us of what
is at stake in conversations about naturalization—the identities,
relationships, and aspirations of individuals who have relocated their lives
and reoriented their very selves to become American.
The road to citizenship is complex and exacting, 2 and Congress has
shown an intent to allow federal courts to aid in this valuable process.
Nonetheless, there exists a deep circuit split over immigration proceedings
and federal subject-matter jurisdiction. Specifically, the divide centers upon
the effect of a United States Citizenship and Immigration Services
(Immigration Services) request to a district court to defer to pending
removal proceedings by dismissing an alien’s pending naturalization
appeal.
Circuits have responded in four different ways, and in Klene v.
Napolitano the Seventh Circuit issued the most recent decision on the
issue. 3 The Klene court briefly discussed each potential approach before
adopting the Third Circuit’s stance that no such dismissal is required
because “subject-matter jurisdiction continues and . . . a remedy is
possible—a declaratory judgment of entitlement to citizenship.”4
Competing with this declaratory-judgment approach are the approaches
that other circuits have adopted. These alternative views include the
mootness-doctrine approach of the Tenth Circuit 5; the lack-of-jurisdiction
1. Zaranska v. U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., 400 F. Supp. 2d 500, 510-11 (E.D.N.Y.
2005) (emphasis added) (quoting H.R. REP. NO. 101-187, at 11 (1989)).
2. 135 CONG. REC. 16996 (1989) (statement of Rep. Brooks) (“Once applicants have
made their way through the mysterious Immigration and Naturalization Service procedure,
their path to citizenship is delayed once again. . . . I urge my fellow [m]embers to join me in
making naturalization an enriching rather than discouraging experience . . . .”)
3. 697 F.3d 666 (7th Cir. 2012).
4. Id. at 668.
5. Awe v. Napolitano, 494 F. App’x 860 (10th Cir. 2012).
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approach of the Fourth and Fifth Circuits 6; and the failure-of-relief
approach of the Second, Sixth, and Ninth Circuits. 7
Because Congress exhibited an intent for the judiciary to hold review
power over naturalization applications, and because the preservation of this
review power is consistent with a healthy immigration system, a proper
interpretation of 8 U.S.C. § 1421 will grant courts the jurisdiction to hear
naturalization appeals under a de novo standard of review.
I. Background and History: Shifting Structures Cause Confusion
Relatively recent developments in immigration law have given rise to the
interpretive question at issue in Klene and related cases. The structure of
U.S. immigration agencies and processes has seen significant change within
the last seventy years, and discussions of the system must acknowledge its
complex and multifaceted nature. There is no single federal agency or
department governing immigration, but rather, the Department of
Homeland Security (Homeland Security), the Department of Justice, the
Department of State, the Department of Labor, and the Department of
Health and Human Services all play a part in defining and maintaining the
field. 8
Homeland Security involves three separate agencies in immigration
matters: Immigration Services, U.S. Customs and Border Protection, and
U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement. 9 At the most basic level,
Customs and Border Protection regulate traffic into and out of the United
States, while Immigration and Customs Enforcement enforces immigrationrelated laws within the country’s border.10 Immigration Services, on the
other hand, is the Homeland Security agency that governs benefits, status,
and naturalization11 and is, therefore, the agency that oversees the type of
proceedings involved in Klene and its sister cases.
Immigration Services is one of two Homeland Security agencies that
entirely replaced the Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) in

6. Barnes v. Holder, 625 F.3d 801 (4th Cir. 2010); Saba-Bakare v. Chertoff, 507 F.3d
337 (5th Cir. 2007).
7. Ajlani v. Chertoff, 545 F.3d 229 (2d Cir. 2008); De Lara Bellajaro v. Schiltgen, 378
F.3d 1042 (9th Cir. 2004); Zayed v. United States, 368 F.3d 902 (6th Cir. 2004).
8. Janet B. Beck, Immigration Law: Myths and Realities, HOUS. LAW., Mar.-Apr.
2009, at 8, 9.
9. Id.
10. Id.
11. Id.
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2003. 12 The 2003 restructuring is significant for both theoretical and
practical reasons. First, following the change, “backlogs and processing
delays have reached . . . ‘unprecedented levels,’” causing significant
adverse effects for immigrants, businesses, and families. 13 This was a
matter of concern in Klene and similar cases where agency action could
keep potential plaintiffs in a state of unreviewable limbo regarding their
status. 14 Second, some advocates have identified a “culture of no” within
Immigration Services following the restructuring. 15 Third, the Title VIII
statutes in question, along with the court cases interpreting these statutes,
refer to the Attorney General as the head of the naturalizing and removing
agency. 16 Technically, such cases should now be addressed to the Secretary
of Homeland Security. 17 Nonetheless, most texts discussing the issue—
including recent case law—have continued the convention of referring to
the attorney general to indicate Immigration Services as an agency and
party to proceedings. 18 This Comment will follow the same convention.
A. Relevant Statutes Supply Granting and Limiting Language
Klene and its counterpart cases wrestle with the relationship between 8
U.S.C. §§ 1421(c) and 1429 as amended in 1990. 19 Both statutes speak to
the review of naturalization applications, and their amended language has
left their interaction in a state of confusion.20
Section 1421(c) (Granting Statute) grants the right of judicial review to
individuals whose naturalization applications have been denied by
Immigration Services, stating that these individuals:
[M]ay seek review of such denial before the United States
district court for the district in which such person resides . . . .
Such review shall be de novo, and the court shall make its own

12. Peter M. Isbister, Current Developments, Developments in the Executive Branch, 18
GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 595, 595 (2004).
13. Id.
14. See, e.g., Gonzalez v. Sec’y of Dep’t of Homeland Sec., 678 F.3d 254, 260-61 (3d
Cir. 2012).
15. Isbister, supra note 12, at 596.
16. See Ajlani v. Chertoff, 545 F.3d 229, 231 n.2 (2d Cir. 2008).
17. Id.
18. See, e.g., id.
19. See, e.g., Klene v. Napolitano, 697 F.3d 666, 668-69 (7th Cir. 2012).
20. Id.
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findings of fact and conclusions of law and shall, at the request
of the petitioner, conduct a hearing de novo on the application. 21
In short, through this Granting Section Congress gave the federal court
system valid subject-matter jurisdiction over final Immigration Services
denials of immigrants’ naturalization applications.22
The second relevant statute, § 1429 (Limiting Section) prevents the
attorney general from deciding a naturalization application while a removal
proceeding is ongoing: “[N]o application of naturalization shall be
considered by the Attorney General if there is pending against the applicant
a removal proceeding pursuant to a warrant of arrest . . . .”23 Thus, the
attorney general’s power to review applications is expressly limited.
The language of these statute sections appeared in the 1990 update from
the original Immigration and Naturalization Act of 1952, under which
courts maintained sole authority over naturalization and the Attorney
General held the authority to remove aliens. 24 As courts have explained,
“[T]his bifurcation of authority sometimes led to ‘a race between the alien
to gain citizenship and the Attorney General to deport him.’”25
Consequently, Congress enacted the Limiting Section to address this
situation by preventing action on a naturalization application until removal
proceedings were closed, effectively prioritizing such removal
proceedings. 26
B. Courts Now Face an Interpretive Challenge
The challenge facing courts attempting to navigate the interaction
between the Granting and Limiting Sections results from ambiguities this
amendment introduced. With the 1990 update, Congress intended to
increase efficiency and decrease adverse district-court docket effects. 27 This
21. 8 U.S.C. § 1421(c) (2012).
22. See id.
23. Id. § 1429.
24. Jessica Schneider, Comment, Waiting to Be an American: The Courts’ Proper Role
and Function in Alleviating Naturalization Applicants’ Woes in 8 U.S.C. § 1447(B) Actions,
29 ST. LOUIS U. PUB. L. REV. 581, 584-86 (2010).
25. Gonzalez v. Sec’y of Dep’t of Homeland Sec., 678 F.3d 254, 257 (3d Cir. 2012)
(citing Shomberg v. United States, 348 U.S. 540, 544 (1955)); see also Ajlani v. Chertoff,
545 F.3d 229, 235-36 (2d Cir. 2008).
26. Ajlani, 545 F.3d at 236.
27. See, 135 CONG. REC. 16995 (1989) (statement of Rep. Morrison) (“This legislation,
while technical in nature, addresses a very substantial concern . . . and that is the problem of
long backlogs in moving through the naturalization process . . . .”); Etape v. Chertoff, 497
F.3d 379, 386 (4th Cir. 2007).
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modification granted the Attorney General sole authority over
naturalizations and redefined the court’s role in the process. 28 The
amendment also allowed district courts de novo review power over
naturalizations that the Attorney General denied or upon which the
Attorney General failed to make a determination within 120 days.29 To
reflect these changes in the respective roles of the courts and the Attorney
General, Congress amended the Limiting Section’s language. Where the
section previously stated that “no petition for naturalization shall be finally
heard by a naturalization court if there is pending against the petitioner a
deportation proceeding,” 30 it now states that “no application for
naturalization shall be considered by the Attorney General” if removal
proceedings are pending. 31
These gradual adjustments to the naturalization and removal processes
created uncertainty.
1. Proper Application of 8 C.F.R. § 1239.2(f)
One example of this uncertainty is the contention surrounding how 8
C.F.R. § 1239.2(f) (Declaration Regulation) ought to apply. That
regulation, originally dating back to 2003, provides that even when removal
proceedings are open, an immigration judge may terminate them—thereby
allowing the immigrant to move to a final hearing on her naturalization
application—when that immigrant “has established prima facie eligibility
for naturalization and the matter involves exceptionally appealing or
humanitarian factors.” 32 In 1975, the Board of Immigration appeals
determined that for purposes of this regulation,33 an immigrant could
establish prima facie eligibility only by an “affirmative communication
from [Homeland Security] or by a declaration of a court that the alien
would be eligible for naturalization but for the pendency of the deportation
proceedings or the existence of an outstanding order of deportation.” 34 The
Board of Immigration Appeals further determined that neither the Board
itself nor immigration judges could make this affirmative declaration due to

28. 8 U.S.C. § 1421(a) (2012).
29. Id. §§ 1421(c), 1447(b).
30. 8 U.S.C. § 1429 (1952) (emphasis added).
31. 8 U.S.C. § 1429 (2012) (emphasis added).
32. 8 C.F.R. § 1239.2(f) (2014).
33. Actually, a preceding, but nearly identical regulation. 8 C.F.R. § 242.7(a) (1975).
34. Barnes v. Holder, 625 F.3d 801, 804 (4th Cir. 2010) (quoting In re Cruz, 15 I. & N.
Dec. 236, 237 (B.I.A. 1975)).
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a lack of “authority with respect to the naturalization of aliens.”35 This
language suggests that the federal court’s naturalization authority may be
the reason the Board of Immigration Appeals also considered the courts
capable of offering affirmative declarations.
When Congress updated the statute and transferred the powers of
naturalization to the attorney general in 1990, it became unclear whether
courts retained the capacity to offer these affirmative declarations of prima
facie eligibility for naturalization.36 The Board of Immigration Appeals
offered its stance in In re Hidalgo in 2007. 37 There the Board held that only
Homeland Security could provide the type of affirmative communication
required to terminate removal proceedings under the Declaration
Regulation. 38
Then in 2010, the Fourth Circuit joined the Board of Immigration
Appeals’ In re Hidalgo determination that federal courts may no longer
make affirmative declarations of eligibility for naturalization.39 To reach
this conclusion, the Fourth Circuit held that the Board had correctly
interpreted and applied the Declaration Regulation against the updated
statutory scheme and that the regulation was not inconsistent with the
relevant statute, namely the Granting Section.40
This Board of Immigration Appeals’s interpretation has not gone without
criticism, however. In contrast with the Fourth Circuit, the Third Circuit
held in 2012 that federal courts are, indeed, competent to make declarations
of prima facie eligibility for naturalization. 41 The Third Circuit concluded
that allowing courts to issue declaratory judgments as valid relief in denied
naturalization appeals was not only consistent with the Granting Section but
was required by Congress’ clear intent to provide federal courts with
exactly this type of de novo review power.42 The question then becomes:
was the Third Circuit—and the other circuit courts that have reached the
same conclusion—correct in asserting that valid jurisdiction to hear
naturalization appeals is, in fact, the proper interpretation of congressional
intent as expressed in the Granting and Limiting Sections of Title VIII?

35.
36.
37.
38.
39.
40.
41.
42.

Id.
Id. at 804-05.
24 I. & N. Dec. 103 (B.I.A. 2007).
Id. at 106.
Barnes, 625 F.3d at 806-07.
Id.
Gonzalez v. Sec’y of Dep’t of Homeland Sec., 678 F.3d 254, 260-61 (3d Cir. 2012).
Id.
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2. Proper Interpretation of the Granting and Limiting Sections
In addition to the lingering questions about the judiciary’s capacity to
make prima facie declarations, ambiguity as to congressional priorities and
the scope of valid jurisdiction continues to result from the statutory
amendments. 43 These uncertainties have led to continuing difficulties
surrounding the role of courts in situations involving both de novo review
of denied naturalization and open removal proceedings, 44 and it is on these
ambiguities that this Comment will focus.
Specifically, courts addressing the issue have asked the following: (1)
does the current statutory language preserve the INA’s original
prioritization of removal proceedings over naturalization proceedings45; (2)
does the statutory prohibition upon the attorney general’s consideration of
naturalization applications during open removal proceedings similarly
prohibit courts from acting 46; and (3) if courts retain the power to act upon
naturalization applications, do open removal proceedings limit the types of
relief available? 47 Circuit courts have greatly varied in their answers to
these questions, resulting in a four-way split among circuits that emphasize
the mootness doctrine, deny the existence of jurisdiction, allow jurisdiction
but refuse relief, and that provide full relief under valid jurisdiction. 48
II. Current Circuit Precedents: A Four-Way Rift
A. The Tenth Circuit Applies the Mootness-Doctrine Approach
The Tenth Circuit addressed the issue of jurisdiction in the unpublished
decision of Awe v. Napolitano. 49 In Awe, the court determined that the suit
failed to present a case or controversy because the Immigration Services
removal proceedings rendered the naturalization appeal moot. 50
Ahmed Awe became a legal permanent resident of the United States in
1968. 51 In 1976, when Awe was eighteen years old, he was convicted of
43. Kirk L. Peterson, Note, “Final” Orders of Deportation, Motions to Reopen and
Reconsider, and Tolling Under the Judicial Review Provisions of the Immigration and
Nationality Act, 79 IOWA L. REV. 439, 441-42 (1994).
44. Klene v. Napolitano, 697 F.3d 666, 667-68 (7th Cir. 2012).
45. See, e.g., Ajlani v. Chertoff, 545 F.3d 229, 239 (2d Cir. 2008).
46. See, e.g., Klene, 697 F.3d at 667-69.
47. See, e.g., De Lara Bellajaro v. Schiltgen, 378 F.3d 1042, 1046-47 (9th Cir. 2004).
48. Klene, 697 F.3d at 667-68.
49. 494 F. App’x 860 (10th Cir. 2012).
50. Id. at 866.
51. Id. at 861.

Published by University of Oklahoma College of Law Digital Commons, 2015

566

OKLAHOMA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 67:559

burglary. 52 Seven years later he pleaded guilty to multiple drug charges, but
the Oklahoma governor ultimately pardoned him for this conviction in
2006. 53 Following the pardon, in 2007, Awe applied for naturalization. 54
Nonetheless, Immigration Services determined—based on the pardoned
drug conviction—that Awe belonged to the class of removable aliens, per a
statutory requirement of good moral character, and denied his application.55
In May 2010, Awe filed a petition with the district court for review of the
denial of his naturalization application.56 While his application was
pending, in August 2010, Immigration Services placed Awe in removal
proceedings, based again on his pardoned 1983 drug conviction. 57 The State
then filed a motion to dismiss the district court case, arguing that pursuant
to the Limiting Section, the initiation of removal proceedings precluded the
court’s proper exercise of jurisdiction.58 The court agreed, holding in effect,
that plaintiff Awe had failed to state a claim upon which relief could be
granted. 59 The district court subsequently determined that the Limiting
Section would prevent the court from remanding with instructions for the
agency to naturalize. 60 Therefore, the court dismissed the action in
accordance with Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). 61
Although, like the district court, the Tenth Circuit ultimately dismissed
the case without prejudice, it rejected the lower court’s reasoning. 62 The
Tenth Circuit’s opinion surveyed the relevant case law issuing from other
circuits, stating, “Several circuits . . . have concluded that § 1429 [Limiting
Section] does not strip jurisdiction, agreeing that the plain terms of the
statute prohibit only the Attorney General . . . from considering a
naturalization application when removal proceedings are pending against an
alien.” 63 The court further recognized the four circuits that have reached
such a conclusion have nonetheless held that courts are precluded from
granting relief in cases involving open removal proceedings, due to the

52.
53.
54.
55.
56.
57.
58.
59.
60.
61.
62.
63.

Id.
Id. at 861-62.
Id. at 862.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 863.
Id. at 862-63.
Id. at 866-67.
Id. at 863.
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ultimate effect of the Limiting Section. 64 The Tenth Circuit agreed that the
Limiting Section does not function to invalidate district court jurisdiction
over naturalization application reviews and concluded along with the four
aforementioned circuits “that removal proceedings, whether in process at
the time a § 1421(c) [Granting Section] petition is filed or initiated
thereafter, effectively bar federal consideration . . . by virtue of § 1429
[Limiting Section].” 65 It reached this result, however, upon the “Doctrine of
Constitutional Mootness” and not upon the lower court’s application of
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6).66
Specifically, then, the Tenth Circuit held that a district court order to
Immigration Services to grant plaintiff Awe’s naturalization application
could not be effective, due to the Limiting Section’s prohibition on
Immigration Services action during open removal proceedings. 67 Thus,
because such an order would be ineffective, the court articulated that
“removal proceedings constituted a ‘change of circumstances’ that
precluded any ‘conclusive’ or ‘specific relief.’”68 Furthermore, the court
determined that even if Awe had requested declaratory relief, that request
would be similarly moot. 69 The court reached this conclusion because,
pursuant to the Limiting Section, even a court declaration could not enable
the agency to act on a naturalization request while removal proceedings
were pending. 70
Although the Tenth Circuit recognized that disallowing district court
review could allow Immigration Services to evade judicial review by
opening removal proceedings after any denial of a naturalization
application, the court decided that consideration of this difficulty falls
within the purview of Congress and not the courts. 71
B. The Fourth and Fifth Circuits Apply the Lack-of-Jurisdiction Approach
The Fourth and Fifth Circuits have interpreted the Limiting Section even
more stringently than the Tenth Circuit. That is, these courts have taken the
Limiting language to mean that removal proceedings directly deprive

64.
65.
66.
67.
68.
69.
70.
71.

Id.
Id. at 865.
Id. at 865-66.
Id. at 866.
Id.
Id. at 866-67.
Id at 866.
Id. at 867.
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district courts of the subject-matter jurisdiction required to hear
naturalization appeals.72
1. Fifth Circuit
In Saba-Bakare v. Chertoff, the Fifth Circuit determined that it lacked
subject-matter jurisdiction in a case involving a Nigerian resident alien
seeking review of the denial of his naturalization application.73 Appellant
Kehinde Saba-Bakare became a legal permanent resident of the United
States in early 1986. 74 When, in April 2003, Saba-Bakare attempted to
reenter the United States following a brief trip, immigration authorities took
note of a previous second-degree sexual assault conviction and refused to
readmit Saba-Bakare. 75 Removal proceedings began that day. 76 During the
pendency of these proceedings, Saba-Bakare filed a naturalization
application with Immigration Services and a motion to terminate the
removal proceedings with an immigration judge. 77 Following the
immigration judge’s denial of the motion, Immigration Services denied
Saba-Bakare’s naturalization application, despite the fact that a removal
proceeding remained open and the Limiting Section should have functioned
to prevent such a ruling. 78
Consequently, Saba-Bakare initiated a federal suit, requesting de novo
review of his application—as the Granting Section expressly permits—and
a declaratory judgment of his prima facie eligibility for naturalization. 79
The district court “vacated [Immigration Service]’s decision denying SabaBakare’s application for naturalization” and remanded the application for
Immigration Services to consider only once removal proceedings had
closed, thereby acknowledging the mandate of the Limiting Section.80 The
district court denied Saba-Bakare’s request for declaratory judgment,
however, stating that it lacked subject-matter jurisdiction and dismissing all
of the claims it had not remanded.81

72. See, e.g., Barnes v. Holder, 625 F.3d 801, 805-06 (4th Cir. 2010); Saba-Bakare v.
Chertoff, 507 F.3d 337, 341 (5th Cir. 2007).
73. 507 F.3d at 340-42.
74. Id. at 338.
75. Id.
76. Id.
77. Id. at 339.
78. Id.
79. Id.
80. See id.
81. Id. at 340.
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On appeal, the Fifth Circuit affirmed the district court’s determination
that it lacked valid jurisdiction over Saba-Bakare’s remaining claims,
specifically considering and rejecting three proposed sources of
jurisdiction: the Granting Section, the Declaration Regulation, and 8 U.S.C.
§ 1447(b). 82
First, the court addressed Saba-Bakare’s contention that the Granting
Section gave the court the ability to rule on his naturalization application by
establishing district court review of application denials. 83 The circuit court
drew attention to the fact that the Granting Section constrains courts’
reviewing authority to that of denials of naturalization, and “[a]s the initial
denial of [Saba-Bakare’s] application ha[d] no continuing legal effect,
neither it nor the underlying findings of the [Immigration Services could]
be reviewed.” 84 That is, because Immigration Services improperly denied
Saba-Bakare’s application while a removal proceeding was pending, there
existed no valid denial for the circuit court to review.
Second, the court held that, when an administrative delay is necessary
because of the Limiting Section’s requirements, that delay will not satisfy
the 120-day window referenced in 8 U.S.C. § 1447(b). 85 Thus, the district
court may not maintain jurisdiction on these grounds. 86
Third, the court addressed Saba-Bakare’s request for a declaration of
prima facie eligibility pursuant to the Declaration Regulation. 87 Under this
regulation, an immigration judge may terminate a removal proceeding,
thereby enabling an alien to proceed to a final naturalization hearing if that
alien (1) establishes prima facie eligibility and (2) presents “exceptionally
appealing or humanitarian factors.” 88
Prior to the 1990 amendments to the Immigration and Naturalization
Act, the Board of Immigration Appeals held, in In re Cruz, that “‘prima
facie eligibility may be established by an affirmative communication from
[Immigration Services] or by a declaration of a court.’” 89 The Saba-Bakare
court, however, determined that “in light of the 1990 amendment to § 1421
[Granting Section], In re Cruz indicates that only an affirmative

82.
83.
84.
85.
86.
87.
88.
89.
1975)).

Id. at 340-41.
Id. at 340.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 340-41.
8 C.F.R. § 1239.2(f) (2014).
Saba-Bakare, 507 F.3d at 341 (quoting In re Cruz, 15 I. & N. Dec. 236, 237 (B.I.A.
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communication from [Immigration Services] may establish prima facie
eligibility.” 90
In so ruling, the Fifth Circuit effectively held that Immigration Services
may sidestep review of a naturalization application denial by declining to
rule on the application and initiating removal proceedings within 120
days. 91 Under the Fifth Circuit’s reasoning in Saba-Bakare, (1) district
courts cannot review a naturalization application without a previous denial,
where the simple initiation of removal proceedings will ensure such a
denial will never be necessary, and (2) only Immigration Services itself
may make a determination of prima facie eligibility for naturalization.92
Consequently, the Fifth Circuit may have replaced the previous “race” to
deport with a waiting game of sorts, in which Immigration Services may
use strategic timing to entirely deny an immigrant any meaningful
naturalization appeal.
That is not to say that the Fifth Circuit failed to consider the equitable
ramifications of its decision. In fact, it acknowledged that without the
possibility of district court review, an Immigration Services finding that an
alien lacks prima facie eligibility could “render the . . . eligibility issue
unreviewable by any court” and called this point “Saba-Bakare’s most
compelling argument.” 93 Nonetheless, the court reiterated what it
considered to be a correct interpretation of the existing statutory framework
and stated that even a “persuasive equitable concern” would be an issue for
Congress to resolve and not an appropriate means by which to establish
jurisdiction in these cases. 94
2. Fourth Circuit
Likewise, the Fourth Circuit, in Barnes v. Holder, held that any right to a
district court review that plaintiff Barnes had under the Granting Section
was subject to the boundaries the Limiting Section established. 95 Barnes,
who had been a permanent resident of the United States since 1979, was
convicted of a drug crime in 1982 while serving in the U.S. Army. 96

90. Id. at 341 (citing In re Hidalgo, 24 I. & N. Dec. 103, 105 (B.I.A. 2007)).
91. See 8 U.S.C. §§ 1421(c) (2012) (allowing district courts de novo review power over
naturalizations that the Attorney General denied or failed to make a determination upon
within 120 days).
92. Id. at 341-42.
93. Id. at 341.
94. Id.
95. 625 F.3d 801, 806 (4th Cir. 2010).
96. Id. at 802.
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Twenty-two years later, in 2004, Immigration Services began removal
proceedings against Barnes, based on the 1982 conviction. 97 Barnes filed a
motion with an immigration judge, requesting a termination of removal
proceedings pursuant to the Declaration Regulation. 98 The immigration
judge denied this motion, and the Board of Immigration Appeals affirmed,
dismissing Barnes’ appeal. 99
In assessing Barnes’ subsequent appeal to the federal courts, the Fourth
Circuit reached the same conclusion as the Fifth and held that In re Hidalgo
correctly characterized the state of the Declaration Regulation following the
1990 statutory amendments. 100 In In re Hidalgo, the Board of Immigration
Appeals held that courts could no longer make declarations of prima facie
eligibility for naturalization, as the attorney general now holds exclusive
authority over naturalization. 101 The Fourth Circuit then addressed Barnes’
assertion that the Granting Section firmly provided a right to judicial review
by holding that any such right possibly granted is curtailed by the Limiting
Section. 102 The court reached this conclusion by referencing canons of
construction that require harmonious readings where possible103 and stating
that such a reading of the Granting and Limiting Sections yields “the
conclusion that an alien has a statutory right to review of his naturalization
application, unless he is in removal proceedings.” 104 The court suggested
this was the natural, logical conclusion, as a lack of right to initial
adjudication must result in a lack of right to judicial review. 105
Thus, in both the Fourth and Fifth Circuits, district courts lack subjectmatter jurisdiction to review denied naturalization applications when a
removal proceeding is pending. 106
C. The Second, Sixth, and Ninth Circuits Apply the Lack-of-Remedy
Approach
In contrast to the Fourth and Fifth Circuits, the Second, Sixth, and Ninth
Circuits have held that district courts do, in fact, retain valid subject-matter

97.
98.
99.
100.
101.
102.
103.
104.
105.
106.

Id.
Id. at 802-03.
Id. at 803.
Id. at 805-07.
In re Hidalgo, 24 I. & N. Dec. 103 (B.I.A. 2007).
Barnes, 625 F.3d at 806.
Id. (citing United States v. Fisher, 58 F.3d 96, 99 (4th Cir. 1995)).
Id. (emphasis added).
Id. at 806-07.
Id. at 807-08; Saba-Bakare v. Chertoff, 507 F.3d 337, 338 (5th Cir. 2007).
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jurisdiction. 107 Nonetheless, these circuits have determined that district
courts have no power to offer effective relief, holding that removal
proceedings will prevent a remedy and require that “judgment must go for
the agency on the merits.” 108 In other words, these three circuits have
determined that, despite valid subject-matter jurisdiction, they can neither
remand with instructions to the attorney general—as the Limiting Section
does prevent agency action even where it does not so burden the court—nor
make an appropriate and effective declaration. 109
1. Sixth Circuit
In Zayed v. United States, the Sixth Circuit heard the appeal of Dalal
Zayed. 110 Zayed was admitted to the United States in 1991 as the unmarried
daughter of a lawful permanent resident.111 Then, in 1996, Zayed applied
for naturalization.112 On her application, Zayed stated that she resided with
her parents from 1988 until 1991. 113 In addition, she stated that she and her
husband had divorced in 1988 before remarrying in 1992. 114 During its
investigation of Zayed’s application, the Immigration and Naturalization
Service (the predecessor of today’s agency) discovered that Zayed had
resided with her husband for at least two years while the couple was
purportedly divorced. 115 After determining that Zayed’s application
responses were false, along with the possibility that her divorce was a
“sham . . . to obtain lawful permanent residence [in the United States] as an
unmarried daughter,” the agency informed Zayed of its intention to deny
her naturalization application.116 Following the official denial and the
exhaustion of administrative appeal procedures, Zayed filed a petition for

107. Klene v. Napolitano, 697 F.3d 666, 667-68 (7th Cir. 2012) (citing Ajlani v.
Chertoff, 545 F.3d 229 (2d Cir. 2008); De Lara Bellajaro v. Schiltgen, 378 F.3d 1042, 1047
(9th Cir. 2004); Zayed v. United States, 368 F.3d 902, 905-06 (6th Cir. 2004)).
108. Klene, 697 F.3d at 667; see also Ajlani, 545 F.3d at 238-41; Zayed, 368 F.3d at 90506; Bellajaro, 378 F.3d at 1047.
109. See Ajlani, 545 F.3d at 237-41; Zayed, 368 F.3d at 905-07; Bellajaro, 378 F.3d at
1045-47.
110. 368 F.3d at 904.
111. Id. at 903.
112. Id.
113. Id.
114. Id.
115. Id. at 904.
116. Id.

https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/olr/vol67/iss3/4

2015]

COMMENTS

573

review with the district court. 117 The Immigration and Naturalization
Service began removal proceedings soon after.118
The district court dismissed Zayed’s petition on the theory that it lacked
jurisdiction, pursuant to the Limiting Section.119 The court used a
purposivist approach to statutory interpretation and concluded that
Congress actually intended to continue “‘to emphasize deportation
proceedings over the naturalization process’” and to prevent any
consideration of naturalization applications during the pendency of open
removal proceedings. 120
Although the Sixth Circuit reached the same result as the district court,
dismissing Zayed’s petition without prejudice, it did so on different
grounds. The Sixth Circuit, after briefly establishing appellate jurisdiction
as a general matter,121 established valid subject-matter jurisdiction based
upon the Granting Section. 122 Contrary to the reasoning of the district court,
the Sixth Circuit found it “difficult to square the agency’s response with the
plain language” of the Limiting Section as “[b]y its terms, the statute limits
the authority of ‘the Attorney General’—not the authority of the district
courts—to act on applications for naturalization.” 123 The court did,
however, take the time to underscore the reasonableness of the district
court’s conclusion, noting that the 1990 statutory language does appear to
preserve Congress’ formerly established prioritization of removal
proceedings over naturalization proceedings. 124 Despite its decision to
acknowledge and maintain the priority of removal proceedings, the Sixth
Circuit held that it did not “read the amended [Limiting Section] as
divesting the district courts of the jurisdiction granted under [the Granting
Section].” 125
The court did not end its analysis there, however, but continued to
analyze the effects of the Limiting Section on courts’ ability to effectively

117. Id.
118. Id.
119. Id.
120. Id. (“Adopting the approach to statutory interpretation urged upon it by the
government . . . the district court elected to follow what it saw as the true intent of Congress
without necessarily adhering to the letter of the statutory language.”).
121. Id. at 904-05 (“We have jurisdiction of Ms. Zayed’s appeal under 28 U.S.C. § 1291,
the appeal having been taken from a final decision of the district court.”).
122. Id. at 905-06.
123. Id. at 905.
124. Id. at 905-06.
125. Id. at 906.
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provide relief. 126 Specifically, the court determined that the statutory
language prevented the district court from either ordering the attorney
general to naturalize Zayed or granting the application itself.127
2. Second Circuit
The Second Circuit held similarly in Ajlani v. Chertoff, deciding that
there was no available relief.128 In that case, Majed Ajlani, a Syrian
national, entered the United States in 1987 and gained lawful permanent
resident status in 1996 through his marriage to a U.S. citizen.129 Despite the
fact that Ajlani picked up four convictions—for forgery, false reporting,
trespass, and fraud—during his twenty years in the United States,
Immigration Services granted his naturalization application in 2006. 130
After his application was approved, but before he could take his oath of
allegiance, Ajlani exited and attempted to reenter the United States via
Canada. 131 The event caused border officials to examine Ajlani’s status, and
Immigration Services soon opened removal proceedings. 132
After a string of conflicting agency actions (e.g. notifying Ajlani of his
naturalization oath opportunity before intercepting him at the oath
ceremony with service of process), Immigration Services ultimately
reopened Ajlani’s naturalization proceedings and began moving forward
with removal proceedings. 133 Ajlani brought an action in the district court,
acting pro se and making several claims, including a request for a judicial
order to either compel a hearing upon or grant his naturalization. 134 The
district court dismissed the case, pointing to Ajlani’s failure to “state a
claim upon which relief may be granted” under the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure 12(b)(6). 135
On appeal, the Second Circuit upheld the district court’s analysis,
holding, in relevant part, that (1) subject-matter jurisdiction was valid under
the Granting Section, but (2) the “scope of the court’s review” and capacity
126. Id. at 906-07 (“The fact that the statute precludes the relief sought requires this
result. . . . The petition having been dismissed without prejudice, Ms. Zayed will have an
opportunity to file a new petition if she prevails in the removal proceedings.”).
127. Id. at 906.
128. 545 F.3d 229, 229-30 (2008).
129. Id. at 231.
130. Id. at 231-32.
131. Id. at 232.
132. Id.
133. Id. at 232-33.
134. Id. at 233.
135. Id.
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to offer remedies was circumscribed by the Limiting Section so as to render
the claim invalid under Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) while
removal proceedings were pending. 136 The Attorney General cannot grant
naturalization when the Limiting Section forbids it.137 This, in turn,
prohibits the district courts from ordering such relief, because the “district
court’s authority to grant naturalization under [the Granting Section] could
not be greater than that of the Attorney General.” 138 The Second Circuit
affirmed the district court’s dismissal of Ajlani’s case, upholding the
district court’s reasoning that Ajlani failed to state a claim for which
“naturalization relief could be granted while removal proceedings were
pending.” 139
3. Ninth Circuit
The Second Circuit’s analysis comports with that of the Ninth Circuit,
which held in De Lara Bellajaro v. Schiltgen that pending removal
proceedings do not undermine subject-matter jurisdiction but do limit the
scope of review possible. 140 In De Lara Bellajaro, a Filipino man in the
United States as a lawful permanent resident was convicted of a sex crime,
imprisoned, and subsequently paroled. 141 In 1986, De Lara Bellajaro
violated the terms of his parole by temporarily returning to his home
country. 142 Following his return to the United States, and after the
expiration of his parole, De Lara Bellajaro reapplied for naturalization in
1994. 143 In 1999, Immigration Services denied De Lara Bellajaro’s
naturalization application for “failure to establish good moral character”
and began removal proceedings. 144 De Lara Bellajaro filed yet another
application for naturalization, as well as a motion to terminate the removal
proceeding. 145 Immigration Services rejected both his application for

136. Id. at 238 (quoting Zayed v. United States, 368 F.3d 902, 906 (6th Cir. 2004)).
137. See id. at 239.
138. Id. (“Thus, if § 1429 would preclude the Attorney General from granting
naturalization to an alien because of pending removal proceedings, an alien could not secure
that relief from a district court pursuant to § 1421(c).” (citing Apokarina v. Ashcroft, 232 F.
Supp. 2d 415, 416 (E.D. Pa. 2002))).
139. Id. at 241. The claim was not dismissed, notably, for lack of jurisdiction. Id.
140. 378 F.3d 1042, 1043-44 (9th Cir. 2004).
141. Id. at 1044.
142. Id.
143. Id.
144. Id.
145. Id.

Published by University of Oklahoma College of Law Digital Commons, 2015

576

OKLAHOMA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 67:559

naturalization and his motion to terminate, after which De Lara Bellajaro’s
appealed to the district court. 146
The district court pointed to the congressional prioritization of removal
over naturalization, opining that a comparative interpretation of the
Granting and Limiting Sections required such prioritization, and reasoned
that “[congressional] intent would be frustrated if judicial review of
naturalization decisions were available under [the Granting Section] while
the removal proceeding is pending.” 147
Although the Ninth Circuit affirmed the lower court’s dismissal of De
Lara Bellajaro’s appeal, it did so for different reasons. 148 The Ninth Circuit
validated federal district courts’ subject-matter jurisdiction over these cases,
declaring that the Granting Section “plainly confers” such jurisdiction and
that there is “no textual basis for concluding that jurisdiction vested in
district courts by [the Granting Section] is divested by [the Limiting
Section].” 149 The circuit court clarified that grant of jurisdiction, however,
by explaining that the scope of review provided in the Granting Section is
limited to the denial of a naturalization application. 150 The court further
stated that where—as in this case—such denial was premised upon the
pendency of removal proceedings, courts may not expand their review
power to declarations of eligibility for naturalization. 151
In this vein, the Ninth Circuit denied De Lara Bellajaro’s request for a
declaration of prima facie eligibility to support the termination of his
removal proceedings, saying that such declaration would be nothing more
than advice, since “discretion to prosecute and to adjudicate removal
proceedings is reposed exclusively in the Attorney General.”152 The court
then declined to make any such “advisory” declaration and, consequently,
affirmed the district court’s dismissal for reasons of limited scope and
unavailability of remedy. 153

146. Id.
147. Id. at 1043.
148. Id.
149. Id. at 1043, 1046.
150. Id. at 1046-47.
151. Id.
152. Id. at 1047 (citing Reno v. American-Arab Anti-Discrimination Comm., 525 U.S.
471, 487 (1999)).
153. Id. at 1047.
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D. The Third and Seventh Circuits Apply the Declaratory-Judgment
Approach
In Klene, the Seventh Circuit joined the Third Circuit, holding that
removal proceedings do not affect federal subject-matter jurisdiction and
that in these cases, district courts may grant the remedy of a declaratory
judgment. 154
1. Third Circuit
The Third Circuit considered the issue in Gonzalez v. Secretary of
Department of Homeland Security, in which Jose Gonzalez appealed the
district court’s dismissal of his petition for review of a denial of
naturalization.155 Gonzalez entered the United States as a non-immigrant
visitor in the late 1990s and subsequently married a U.S. citizen. 156 During
a 2004 interview in support of his Form I-751 petition to convert his lawful
permanent resident status from conditional to non-conditional, Gonzalez
stated under oath that he had no children. 157 After the lifting of his
conditional status, Gonzalez and his wife divorced, and he moved in with
Margarete Picinin, with whom he had been romantically involved during
his marriage. 158 In 2005, Gonzalez amended the birth certificates of
Picinin’s two young children to indicate he was the father. 159 He also listed
the two minors as his children on a 2006 naturalization application, and in
light of this inconsistency, Immigration Services denied his application,
issuing a final denial in 2009. 160
Twelve days after this denial, Immigration Services initiated removal
proceedings, and Gonzalez appealed the denial to the federal district
court. 161 The court dismissed Gonzalez’ appeal in light of the
“‘uncontradicted evidence . . . that [Gonzalez], while under penalty of
perjury, gave false evidence in order to receive a benefit in an immigration
proceeding.’” 162
154. Gonzalez v. Sec’y of Dep’t of Homeland Sec., 678 F.3d 254, 260 (3d Cir. 2012);
Klene v. Napolitano, 697 F.3d 666, 668-69 (7th Cir. 2012).
155. 678 F.3d at 255-56.
156. Id. at 256.
157. Id.
158. Id.
159. Id.
160. Id.
161. Id.
162. Id. at 256-57 (quoting Gonzalez v. Napolitano, No. 2:09-cv-03426, 2011 WL
941299, at *7 (D.N.J. Mar. 16, 2011)).

Published by University of Oklahoma College of Law Digital Commons, 2015

578

OKLAHOMA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 67:559

On appeal, the Third Circuit upheld the district court’s ruling. 163 First,
the circuit court asserted that the district court had valid jurisdiction to hear
and decide the claim. 164 The court traced the history and development of the
current statutory language and concluded that “[b]ased on the plain
language of the statute, we concur with the Ninth Circuit that there is ‘no
textual basis for concluding that jurisdiction vested in district courts by §
1421(c) [(Granting Section)] is divested by § 1429 [(Limiting
Section)].’” 165
In the second portion of its analysis, however, the Third Circuit diverged
from the Ninth. 166 When it addressed whether a district court can offer
effective relief in these situations, the Third Circuit observed the apparent
congressional prioritization of removal proceedings over naturalization
proceedings and stated that the 1990 amendments did not alter this
priority. 167 The court further acknowledged that district courts lacked the
power to offer relief in the form of ordering the Attorney General to
naturalize an alien with pending removal proceedings. 168 Nonetheless, the
court recognized the viability of declaratory judgments as meaningful
relief. 169
In permitting declaratory relief, the Third Circuit countered two issues
that the Sixth Circuit raised in Zayed. 170 First, the Third Circuit addressed
the issue of whether district courts could make authoritative declarations of
prima facie eligibility for naturalization in regard to the Declaration
Regulation. 171 Despite the Board of Immigration Appeals’ ruling in In re
Hidalgo, wherein the Board determined that affirmative declarations as to
prima facie eligibility were squarely—and solely—within agency
discretion, the Third Circuit suggested that In re Cruz remains good law,

163. Id. at 264.
164. Id. at 257.
165. Id. at 257-58 (quoting De Lara Bellajaro v. Schiltgen, 378 F.3d 1042, 1046 (9th Cir.
2004)).
166. Id. at 258-59 (“The Ninth Circuit ultimately concluded that the district court could
not review the denial of naturalization . . . because, while § 1429 did not remove the court’s
jurisdiction, it did limit the scope of review. . . . Having decided that district courts have
jurisdiction, we must now address the more difficult issue of what, if any, relief a district
court may grant.”)
167. Id. at 259.
168. Id.
169. Id. at 259-60.
170. Id. at 259-61.
171. Id. at 260-61.
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even after the 1990 statutory amendments. 172 Under In re Cruz, either
Immigration Services or a court may make such a declaration. 173 In
Gonzalez the Third Circuit stated, “We are confident that the [Board of
Immigration Appeals] would . . . accept the declaration of a district court
properly exercising its jurisdiction under [the Granting Section].” 174 Despite
this assertion, however, the court clarified that it rested its endorsement of
declaratory judgment on a more fundamental basis: judicial ability to effect
congressional intent. 175
Specifically, the court held that “[d]eclaratory relief strikes a balance
between the petitioner’s right to full judicial review as preserved by [the
Granting Section] and the priority of removal proceedings enshrined in [the
Limiting Section],” as Congress clearly granted district courts the power to
conduct de novo reviews of application denials. 176 In other words, the court
held that any other result would “raise[] the possibility that review may be
cut off by the actions of the Attorney General. . . . Such a possibility is
contrary to the intent of Congress as expressed in the structure of the
statute.” 177
Second, the court opined that declaratory relief would not undermine the
prioritization of removal. 178 This is so because a declaration of prima facie
eligibility for naturalization contributes to the record available for the
removal proceeding but does not violate congressional intent by prioritizing
naturalization over removal in any way. 179 In describing this effect, the
Third Circuit held that declaratory relief preserved Congress’ two
“mandated goals, a de novo review process and the elimination of the race
to the courthouse.” 180
2. Seventh Circuit
Like the Third Circuit in Gonzalez, the Seventh Circuit in Klene found
that district courts have valid subject-matter jurisdiction because the
statutory limitation on the Attorney General does not deprive a court of
jurisdiction. 181 In that case, Trinidad Klene, a native of the Philippines,
172.
173.
174.
175.
176.
177.
178.
179.
180.
181.

Id. at 260.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 260-61.
Id. at 260.
Id. at 261.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Klene v. Napolitano, 697 F.3d 666, 668 (7th Cir. 2012).
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lawfully resided in the United States after her marriage to a U.S. citizen.182
Immigration Services denied her application for naturalization, concluding
that her marriage had been fraudulent.183 Klene appealed the denial to the
district court, pursuant to the Granting Section, and Immigration Services
subsequently opened removal proceedings.184 Immigration Services
requested the court dismiss the suit, arguing that the Limiting Section
required the court to do so.185 The district court agreed with the agency and
dismissed Klene’s suit. 186
Klene appealed the district court’s decision to the Seventh Circuit, which
drew a distinction between “[w]hat the Attorney General may do—and
derivatively what a court may order the Attorney General to do” and
jurisdiction itself. 187 It did so by stating that the Attorney General’s
authority “concerns the merits . . . [and] there is a fundamental difference
between mandatory rules, such as the one in § 1429, and jurisdictional
limits,” which Congress crafted to expressly include the authority to
“decide whether aliens are entitled to naturalization” in these cases. 188
The Klene court also espoused declaratory relief as a valid means of
court action, 189 stating that the “approach preserves the alien’s entitlement
under [the Granting Section] to an independent judicial decision while
respecting the limit that [the Limiting Section] places on the Attorney
General’s powers.” 190 The court further acknowledged that appellate review
is deferential and while “[t]he existence of overlapping proceedings does
not diminish a district court’s power[,] . . . [it] does present a question on
which the judge should exercise sound discretion.” 191 Thus, the Seventh
Circuit remanded with instructions to decide whether declaratory judgment
would be appropriate in this particular case. 192
Finally, Klene responded to the issue of mootness, on which the Tenth
Circuit based its decision in Awe. 193 The Klene court held that mootness
was not an issue, as there exists in this case and others a valid case or
182.
183.
184.
185.
186.
187.
188.
189.
190.
191.
192.
193.

Id. at 667.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 668.
Id.
Id. at 668-69.
Id. at 669.
Id. at 669-70.
Id. at 670.
Id. at 668.
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controversy: “[P]arties are locked in conflict . . . . If Klene is right, she can
become a citizen; if the agency is right, Klene [cannot] . . . . Parallel civil
proceedings are common[, and] . . . [u]ntil one of the proceedings reaches
judgment, neither makes the other moot. . . .” 194
Thus, the Klene court appropriately decided the issue in light of
congressional intent and sound policy.
III. Suggested Approach: Valid Jurisdiction Allows Declaratory Judgments
The Third and Seventh Circuits adopted the correct approach to
interpreting the interaction between the Granting and Limiting Sections as
amended. Maintaining valid jurisdiction for federal courts to conduct de
novo review over denials of naturalization applications is not only proper,
but it is also the best option in light of procedural, practical, and policybased concerns.
A. Procedural Concerns Support Jurisdiction
The 1990 amendment to the Limiting Section had no effect on federal
jurisdiction:
Nothing in the [Granting Section] limits the jurisdiction so
conferred . . . . By the same token, the text of [the Limiting
Section] . . . clearly applies to the Attorney General. There is no
hint in the language of [the Limiting Section] that it also applies
to the courts. 195
This is the result that a plain reading and direct interpretation of
Congress’ language effects. Both a reading of the text itself and a look at its
underlying purpose reveal a congressional intent to provide de novo review
in the federal court system to all immigrants whose naturalization
applications have been denied. The text of the Granting Section states that
such immigrants “may seek review” and goes so far as to say that these
reviews will occur “de novo, and the court shall make its own findings of
fact and conclusions of law.” 196 The phrasing is decisive. The standard of
review is generous. The option to place limits or exceptions upon the grant

194. Id.
195. De Lara Bellajaro v. Schiltgen, 378 F.3d 1042, 1046 (9th Cir. 2004); see also Klene,
697 F.3d at 668.
196. 8 U.S.C. § 1421(c) (2012) (emphasis added).
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is unexercised. As the majority of circuits that have spoken to the issue
have found, the grant of jurisdiction is unequivocal.197
This textual interpretation is clear, and a purpose-based reading of the
statute only cements the conclusion that valid federal subject-matter
jurisdiction exists. Congress’ 1990 update to the statutory scheme
authorized this robust review avenue at the same time that it removed
naturalization authority from the courts. 198 This conscious decision to
preserve the judiciary’s role in the process, despite Immigration Service’s
new role, demonstrates what others have identified as an intentionally
“bicameral approach to the naturalization process.” 199 Congress explicitly
directed the language of the Limiting Section at the Attorney General, not
the courts, 200 and applying that limitation to the judiciary would effect a
massive exception nowhere indicated in the statute itself. Thus, allowing
the section to divest courts of jurisdiction requires a skewed interpretation
of the Granting Section.
Moreover, the Supreme Court’s articulation of the deference due to
agency interpretations of statutes supports valid jurisdiction.201 In Chevron,
U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 202 the Court
explained the proper judicial approach in these situations:
When a court reviews an agency’s construction . . . [f]irst,
always, is the question whether Congress has directly spoken to
the precise question at issue. If the intent of Congress is clear,
that is the end of the matter; for the court, as well as the agency,
must give effect to the unambiguously expressed intent of
Congress. 203
This “unambiguously expressed intent” is manifest in both the statute and
the congressional record that supports it. 204 The Act’s sponsor,
197. See supra Part III. Of the six circuits that have refused to rule on these cases, four
have done so because of a lack of remedy and not because of a perceived lack of jurisdiction.
See supra Part III.
198. See supra Part II.B.
199. Daniel Makled, Note, De Novo: A Proposed Compromise to Closing the
Naturalization Review Loophole, 90 U. DET. MERCY L. REV. 367, 376 (2013).
200. 8 U.S.C. § 1429 (“[N]o application for naturalization shall be considered by the
Attorney General if there is pending against the applicant a removal proceeding . . . .”)
(emphasis added).
201. Makled, supra note 199, at 375.
202. 467 U.S. 837 (1984).
203. Id. at 842-43.
204. Makled, supra note 199, at 375-77.
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Representative Morrison, clarified that the Act would “‘not take away any
of the judicial review rights accorded applicants today.’” 205 In addition, the
Senate Judiciary Committee expressed its strong belief that “‘although few
cases for naturalization have been denied, citizenship is the most valued
governmental benefit of this land and applicants should receive full
recourse to the [j]udiciary when the request for that benefit is denied.’”206
This clear legislative intent counsels in favor of maintenance of valid
jurisdiction.
Finally, it is the judiciary’s duty to fully and fairly exercise the
jurisdiction Congress has seen fit to grant it. 207 And it is squarely within this
duty to protect the methods of justice, generally, and of due process,
specifically. 208
B. Practical Considerations Reinforce Jurisdiction
The retention of federal subject-matter jurisdiction in naturalization cases
is not only consistent with statutory language, but it also addresses
overarching concerns 209 by promoting structural efficiency and efficacy.
Academics have identified at least five intersecting sources of difficulty
within immigration adjudication: “substantive immigration law; the
conflicting signals of immigration adjudication; the lack of de facto
independence; the use of diversions from the system; and weakened judicial
review.” 210 Nonetheless, this Comment endeavors to examine a particular
struggle in the realm of immigration law that—though narrow in scope—
carries weighty and immediate consequences for the individual immigrants
affected, as well as enduring consequences for views on the judiciary’s role
in the process. Immigration law functions primarily in the legislative and
205. Id. at 377 (quoting 135 CONG. REC. 16996 (1989) (statement of Rep. Morrison)).
206. Id. (quoting H.R. REP. NO. 101-187, at 14 (1989)).
207. The federal courts have a “virtually unflagging obligation . . . to exercise the
jurisdiction given them,” as the Supreme Court has long recognized “the principle that
‘When a Federal court is properly appealed to in a case over which it has by law jurisdiction,
it is its duty to take such jurisdiction.’” Colo. River Water Conserv’n Dist. v. United States,
424 U.S. 800, 817 (1976); England v. La. State Bd. of Med. Examiners, 375 U.S. 411, 46465 (1964) (quoting Willcox v. Consolidated Gas Co., 212 U.S. 19, 40 (1909)).
208. For cogent arguments on the due process concerns at play in the naturalization
process, see Josh Adams, Federal Court Jurisdiction over Visa Revocations, 32 VT. L. REV.
291, 308-13 (2007); Makled, supra note 199, at 386.
209. Many of these concerns are addressed in other articles. See, e.g., infra notes 210211, 213.
210. Jill E. Family, Beyond Decisional Independence: Uncovering Contributors to the
Immigration Adjudication Crisis, 59 U. KAN. L. REV. 541, 542 (2011) [hereinafter Family,
Beyond Decisional Independence].
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executive branches; so far as Congress has deemed it appropriate to involve
the judicial branch, the courts should take up that legislated mantle
willingly, as they are uniquely positioned to act in ways both independent
of political pressure and responsive to an ever-developing field.
In particular, one of the more cited concerns in discussions of
immigration adjudication, whether regarding agency judges or Article III
courts, is that of appeal rates and docket effects. 211 Between 2002 and 2006,
administrative adjudication appeals increased from 6 percent to 29 percent
of immigration cases,212 and immigration appeals grew to represent
approximately 20 percent of the federal court of appeals docket.213 While
the steadily increasing number of cases appearing on many courts’ dockets
is a substantial concern, a refusal to exercise valid jurisdiction (whether by
holding jurisdiction invalid or by declaring relief to be unavailable) is
neither an appropriate vehicle for managing docket effects nor the best
approach to the problem at large.
First, these discussions of docket effects look at the entire field of
immigration appeals arising from administrative rulings, not solely at cases
involving denied naturalization applications coupled with open removal
proceedings. 214 Second, while some scholars argue that there is too little
transparency in the field to say with certainty why the surge in appeals has
occurred, 215 other scholars have attributed the increase to inadequate
administrative adjudication proceedings. 216 Judge Posner, for one, has
directly stated, “The rise in federal appeals was the result of ‘the fact that
the adjudication of these cases at the administrative level has fallen below
the minimum standards of legal justice.’”217 Third, courts hearing and
ruling upon appeals could eventually contribute to efficiency within the
process, as patterns of affirmations and reversals within federal courts may

211. See, e.g., David C. Koelsch, Follow the North Star: Canada as a Model to Increase
the Independence, Integrity and Efficiency of the U.S. Immigration Adjudication System, 25
GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 763, 779-83 (2011).
212. This figure refers to appeals to the Board of Immigration Appeals from immigration
judges.
213. Lenni B. Benson, You Can’t Get There from Here: Managing Judicial Review of
Immigration Cases, 2007 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 405, 411-12.
214. See id. at 411-13 (discussing studies that show all immigration administrative
appeals as a portion of the entire appeals docket).
215. Id. at 424.
216. Koelsch, supra note 211, at 782.
217. Id. (quoting Benslimane v. Gonzales, 430 F.3d 828, 829-30 (7th Cir. 2005)).
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gradually begin to shape decisions of the originating judges, while
providing much-needed clarity on the bases of decisions. 218
As some have observed, it is largely the “harshness, complexity, and
opacity of substantive immigration law” that fuels the creation of excess
adjudication and gives rise to “huge backlogs in the system.” 219 In
particular, recent “streamlining” attempted by internal agency action has
decreased the availability of clear adjudication to immigrants with cases
from immigration judges or the Board of Immigration Appeals.220
Previously, the Board heard cases in three-member panels, but in 1999, a
pilot program began allowing the Board to hear cases as individual judges
and to rule on cases without providing opinions. 221 The lack of legal
opinions not only increases the likelihood that individual litigants will be
unsatisfied with their adjudicative experience,222 but also lacks the benefit
of issue clarification and well-grounded predictability.
Greater clarity and public transparency would likely provide the benefit
of greater confidence in the adjudicative process, 223 while allowing
immigrants and their counsel to make better-informed decisions about when
and how to pursue appeals. In fact, increased transparency might even
encourage more lawyers to enter the currently under-served practice area224
and aid in providing more equal accessibility to diverse immigrant
demographics. 225 If these effects were achieved, they would contribute to
greater efficiency at a fundamental level—a permanent and preferable
solution to the current burden on appellate courts.

218. Benson, supra note 213, at 431-32.
219. Family, Beyond Decisional Independence, supra note 210, at 542.
220. See John R.B. Palmer, Stephen W. Yale-Loehr & Elizabeth Cronin, Why Are So
Many People Challenging Board of Immigration Appeals Decisions in Federal Court? An
Empirical Analysis of the Recent Surge in Petitions for Review, 20 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 1, 2631 (2005). According to the ABA Commission, summary decisions are “more likely than
standard decisions to be either erroneous, perceived as erroneous, or simply unacceptable to
litigants.” Id. at 54 (emphasis omitted).
221. Benson, supra note 213, at 417-18.
222. Palmer, Yale-Loehr & Cronin, supra note 220, at 54.
223. Addressing an issue that Family has labeled a “lack of esteem” in immigration
adjudication that “both feeds on and helps to promote a negative mystique surrounding
immigration law.” Jill E. Family, Murky Immigration Law and the Challenges Facing
Immigration Removal and Benefits Adjudication, 31 J. NAT’L ASS’N ADMIN. L. JUDICIARY
45, 47, 52-54 (2011).
224. Family, Beyond Decisional Independence, supra note 210, at 542.
225. Id.
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C. Policy Concerns Bolster Jurisdiction
Even acknowledging, as circuit courts have, a congressional intent to
prioritize removal proceedings over naturalization proceedings, allowing
district courts to make declaratory judgments does not offend the intent
underlying the Limiting Section.226 In fact, allowing courts to make these
judgments reinforces the intent that underlies the appeals process that the
Granting Section clearly establishes.227 For reasons discussed, 228 it is
improbable that Congress’ intent in crafting the appellate opportunity in the
Granting Section was to provide a brand of jurisdiction so tenuous that it
might be destroyed by strategic acts of the very agency over which review
was granted. 229
Not only does the exercise of federal subject-matter jurisdiction over
these cases fall squarely within Congress’ intent—as indicated by the
statute, its history, and the legislative record—but the exercise of such
jurisdiction also addresses broader policy concerns. As a number of
legislators, commentators, and scholars have observed, many difficulties
and flaws complicate the United States’ immigration system. 230 Systemic
problems such as administrative delays, 231 unsatisfactory agency appeals
processes, 232 and a lack of clarity 233 threaten the efficacy and fairness of the
naturalization process. Although the involvement of Article III courts in the
process cannot remedy all that ails the system, it would be a significant step
in the right direction by (1) giving proper consideration to expressed
congressional intent, 234 (2) affirming the courts’ role as protectors of
judicial process, 235 (3) addressing specific practical concerns,236 and (4)
serving the aims of fairness and faith in the justice system. 237
In other words, at the core of this question of jurisdiction sits “simple
fairness.” 238 Congress, which represents the United States’ citizenry, has
226.
227.
228.
229.
2012).
230.
231.
232.
233.
234.
235.
236.
237.
238.

See Zayed v. United States, 368 F.3d 902, 905-06 (6th Cir. 2004).
See supra Part III.A.
See supra Part III.A.
See, e.g., Gonzalez v. Sec’y of Dep’t of Homeland Sec., 678 F.3d 254, 259 (3d Cir.
See, e.g., Benson, supra note 213, at 405-06.
See Schneider, supra note 24, at 581-82.
See Koelsch, supra note 211, at 782.
See Family, Beyond Decisional Independence, supra note 210, at 542.
See supra Part III.A.
See supra Part III.A.
See supra Part III.B.
Makled, supra note 199, at 372-73.
Id. at 387.
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clearly granted immigrants the right to a meaningful federal court review of
naturalization denials. 239
IV. Conclusion: Declaratory Judgment Should Prevail as Proper
The Third and Seventh Circuits’ declaratory relief approach best serves
the policies embodied in both the Granting and Limiting Sections (§§
1421(c) and 1429) by maintaining congressional priorities without
undermining the statutory grant of review power. As seen by the factual
outcomes of cases entering the district courts under the Mootness-Doctrine,
Lack-of-Jurisdiction, and Failure-of-Relief Approaches, any approach other
than the Declaratory-Relief Approach creates a real possibility that strategic
agency action will nullify the congressionally crafted grant of jurisdiction
and meaningful review.
Because of the procedure clearly outlined in the Granting Statute, the
practical concerns surrounding the issue, and the manner in which the
Declaratory Relief Approach navigates competing policy concerns while
implementing congressional intent, the federal court system should adopt
the Declaratory-Relief Approach.
Kelsey Frobisher

239. Id. at 388.
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